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Protecting	even	prime	ministers	from	themselves:
Why	fixed-term	parliaments	seem	a	good	idea
Government	runs	roughshod	over	Parliament,	as	the	2017	election	demonstrates.	But	the
Fixed-term	Parliaments	Act	remains	on	the	statute	book.	Graham	Allen	and	Andrew
Blick	explain	what	improvements	can	be	made	to	the	law	and	the	democratic	motivations
behind	them.
Whether	one	extracts	pleasure,	dismay	or	bewilderment	from	the	result	of	the	recent
General	Election,	certain	observations	are	clear.	While	the	early	poll	triggered	by	Theresa	May	–	with	the
compliance	of	an	overwhelming	majority	in	the	House	of	Commons	–	was	intended	to	attain	greater	political
stability,	it	has	achieved	precisely	the	opposite.	Doubts	over	what	type	of	exit	from	the	European	Union	the
government	can	and	will	attempt	to	achieve	have	intensified.	The	authority	of	the	Prime	Minister	in	the	country
and	within	her	own	party	is	considerably	diminished.	Her	security	of	tenure	at	No.10	is	compromised.
In	the	House	of	Commons,	whatever	the	leaders	of	both	the	main	parties	may	claim,	they	both	lost	on	8	June,
though	the	Labour	Party	certainly	outperformed	most	prior	expectations	by	a	wide	margin.	The	closest	equivalent
to	a	winner	was	the	Democratic	Unionist	Party	(DUP).	The	UK	parliamentary	electoral	system	is	sometimes
likened	to	a	lottery,	thanks	to	which	the	DUP	seems	set	to	secure	a	large	payout.	But	while	the	party	is	unlikely	to
break	with	such	a	lucrative	arrangement	over	the	next	two	years	at	least,	DUP	support	for	the	continued
existence	of	a	minority	Conservative	government	is	not	sufficient	to	guarantee	a	stable	administration	(aside	from
the	complications	it	raises	for	the	Northern	Ireland	peace	process).	Maintaining	the	confidence	of	the	Commons	is
not	synonymous	with	winning	every	vote.	On	certain	issues,	some	of	which	are	hard	to	predict,	rebellions	on	the
government	side	could	connect	with	MPs	elsewhere	in	the	Commons	and	leave	the	government	vulnerable	to
defeat.	Fear	of	such	reversals	is	likely	to	afflict	Whitehall	and	lead	to	constant	second-guessing	and	at	times
paralysis.
It	could	be	that	May’s	punishment	for	her	disastrous	error	over	the	election	will	be	to	continue	to	preside	over	an
exceptionally	weak	government,	consumed	by	Brexit	negotiations	in	Europe	and	their	legislative	and	political
consequences	at	home,	and	unable	effectively	to	pursue	any	other	policy	agenda	–	all	in	the	knowledge	that	once
she	is	seen	as	having	outlived	her	usefulness	as	a	scapegoat	she	will	unceremoniously	be	dispensed	with.	This
observation	leads	to	a	consideration	of	how	this	episode	of	self-harm	by	May	and	wider	collateral	damage	to	the
stability	of	the	political	system	came	about.
From	a	constitutional	perspective,	the	answer	is	the	failure	of	the	Fixed-term	Parliaments	Act	2011	to	deliver	on
one	of	its	main	stated	purposes.	This	admirable	objective	was	to	reduce	the	discretion	possessed	by	the	Prime
Minister	in	being	able	to	determine	the	date	of	general	elections.	A	chief	objection	to	the	old	system,	whereby	the
premier	requested	a	Dissolution	from	the	monarch,	was	that	it	provided	an	unfair	advantage	to	the	incumbent	at
No.10.	Advocates	of	the	Act	argued	that	it	would	redress	this	imbalance	in	constitutional	power,	creating	a	more
regular	electoral	timetable	no	longer	subject	to	the	arbitrary	authority	of	the	Prime	Minister.	Early	polls	would	be
subject	to	defined	Commons	approval.	They	could	only	take	place	if	at	least	two	thirds	of	MPs	were	in	agreement,
or	if	a	specially	worded	‘no	confidence’	vote	was	passed	on	a	simple	majority	and	not	reversed	(again	by	a	simple
majority)	within	two	weeks.
However,	these	safeguards	were	not	sufficient	to	prevent	the	Prime	Minister	from	securing	the	2017	General
Election.	On	19	April,	the	two-thirds	majority	she	required	in	the	Commons	was	easily	achieved.	May	was	able	to
obtain	support	from	Opposition	MPs	not	because	they	thought	a	General	Election	was	needed	or	because	they
relished	the	battle,	but	because	of	a	fear	of	being	seen	to	avoid	the	challenge.A	fleet-footed	opposition	could
have	had	a	contingency	for	thinking	outside	of	the	media	box.	An	agreement	to	a	General	Election	could	have
been	linked	to	time	for	proper	parliamentary	and	public	discussion	on	a	date	of	the	Opposition’s	choosing,
perhaps	July	2017,	or	maybe	even	May	2020.
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Labour	MPs	had	no	prepared	alternative.	They	did	not	know	how	well	their	party	ultimately	would	perform,	and
largely	voted	for	the	early	election	despite	their	view	of	the	likely	outcome.	This	occasion	served	to	undermine	the
idea	that	the	Fixed-term	Parliaments	Act	was	a	means	of	protecting	the	integrity	of	the	democratic	system	against
prime-ministerial	manipulation.	Yet	in	the	light	of	the	result	of	June	2017,	while	the	view	that	the	Act	is	flawed	in
this	respect	remains	valid,	it	would	be	hard	to	depict	the	Prime	Minister	as	having	been	a	beneficiary	of	this
defect.	The	ability	of	the	premier	to	behave	arbitrarily	has	not	only	created	instability	in	the	political	system,	it	has
undermined	the	position	of	the	individual	who	deploys	this	power.
Image	credit:	Pixabay/Public	Domain.
The	2017	Conservative	manifesto	committed	to	repealing	the	Act,	without	explaining	why.	Before	the	election,	the
Party’s	objections	to	this	statute	might	have	rested	in	the	idea	that	it	entailed	an	inappropriate	impediment	to	the
triggering	of	polls.	Now	the	Party	might	be	advised	to	find	fault	in	the	Act	for	the	opposite	reason:	that	it	did	not
prevent	a	disastrous	General	Election	from	taking	place.	Assuming	repeal	of	the	legislation	is	not	an	immediate
priority	for	the	government,	it	may	wish	to	take	advantage	of	an	opportunity	to	alter	the	Act	in	a	way	that	takes
account	of	its	recent	unfortunate	experience.
Section	seven	of	the	Act	itself	provides	for	a	review	of	its	operation	to	be	conducted	in	the	second	half	of	2020.
This	process	could	provide	the	occasion	not	for	repeal	of	the	legislation,	but	amendment	to	bring	it	into	line	with
its	original	intention.	In	the	light	of	the	2017	experience,	governments	for	a	time	might	have	a	strong	aversion	to
early	elections.
But	there	is	nonetheless	value	in	ensuring	the	long-term	viability	of	regulation	of	the	electoral	cycle.	The	most
likely	means	of	ensuring	that	early	elections	take	place	only	when	there	is	a	pressing	need	beyond	political
opportunism	is	to	reduce	the	potential	gains	they	will	deliver.	At	present,	a	party	that	wins	a	snap	General
Election	can	obtain	a	full	term	of	office	–	potentially	a	significant	prize,	especially	given	that	the	length	of	a
Parliament	is	set	at	five	years,	relatively	long	in	international	comparison.
Robert	Blackburn	has	proposed	that,	rather	than	resetting	the	electoral	countdown	to	five	years,	the	following
election	should	take	place	on	the	already	scheduled	date.	In	other	words,	the	next	poll	would	be	due	in	May	2020.
Perhaps	even	this	incentive-reduction	would	not	have	been	sufficient	to	prevent	May	from	succumbing	in	April
2017	to	the	temptation	of	a	possible	three-figure	Commons	majority,	which	she	believed	she	might	obtain.	But	it
would	have	changed	the	nature	of	the	calculation	she	made.	If	properly	modified,	the	Act	could	then	prove	more
capable	of	protecting	electors	from	arbitrary	changes;	protecting	the	electoral	cycle;	and	protecting	prime
ministers	from	themselves.	All	parties	should	now	put	forward	their	ideas	on	the	Fixed-term	Parliaments	Act,	so
that	sensible	non-partisan	improvements	can	be	made.
______
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